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For you I would build a
whole new universe but
you obviously find it
cheaper to rent one.
Eurydice did too.
She went back to hell
unsure of
what other house Orpheus
would build. “I call it
death-in-life and lifein-death.” Shot
In the back by an arrow
President Kennedy
seemed to stiffen for a
moment
before he assumed his place
in history. Eros
Do that.
I gave you my imaginary
hand and you give me
your imaginary hand
and we
walk together (in
imagination) over the
earthly ground.
Jack Spicer, “Love Poems”
(1963)1
“My vocabulary did this to me,”
the oft-quoted “last words” of Jack
Spicer, first reported by Robin
Blaser and certainly to some extent
apocryphal, is an ending that is
also usefully a beginning, posing
the problem of defining a poetics
after Spicer. Even as he wrote “The
Practice of Outside” in and around
1975, Blaser seemed to recognize
and anticipate the limiting powers his essay would have on future
Spicer criticism and named what
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the dual and often contradictory
strands of that criticism might look
like: “At first this essay was short
and simple—about Jack. But that
became a reduction which every
twist and turn of the work denied—
a biography without the world the
poet earned or a split between the
man and the work which drank
him up and left him behind” (3).
Due in large part to the limited
availability—and
difficulty—of
Spicer’s body of work, criticism of
the poet has been mired in lore, and
the phrase “my vocabulary did this
to me” has come to name that lore.
What we have left behind is exactly
what Blaser recognized: “the world
the poet earned.”
Recent collections like After
Spicer, edited by John Emil
Vincent, have attempted to address
the need for a new Spicer criticism.
The foregoing verse is quoted in
Anita Sokolsky’s essay “Character
Assassination in the Poetry of
Jack Spicer,” which is included
After Spicer and which poses and
attempts to answer the truly central, even inaugural, questions that
the volume seeks to address: “But
in the name of what is his work
invested in destroying lyric identity? To what end does it appear
increasingly to foreground a notion
of language as a self-implementing
system?” (195). Thus, the “new”
era of Spicer criticism that Vincent
proposes is the era of the runcible
mountain—one in which readers
and critics work backward from

Spicer’s language, through the
poet’s self-erasure of lyric identity
and systems of meaning, to the
ever-disappearing word.
Vincent’s introduction sets readers on a path through the three
sections of text that make up this
collection of critical essays by untangling some of Spicer’s more gnarly
personal and poetic knots and then
retying others for the reader to
solve. The first part of the collection is made up of essays that use
newly available archival materials
to create a critical space wherein
readers can examine the “vexed
and opaque” relationship between
Spicer’s social and academic commitments and his texts and poetic
practices (12). Vincent proposes this
as the first necessary step toward a
Spicer criticism that attends to his
poetics in language, since this space
opens up for readers a “distance
between the poet and the poetry”
necessary “in order to let the poetry
do its work” (12).
Yet, this reading is still “deeply
imbued with the biographical”
until Vincent takes the important
next step of citing Spicer’s formal contrariness, his devotion to
“uncomfortable music” (2). The
second group of essays moves forward within the space created by
the first to introduce relatively new
critical practices to Spicer’s body
of work as a whole, approaching
his poetics from the “impossible,”
“invisible,” and “difficult” orientations of, for example, recent queer
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theory. Later, Vincent notes that
the poems—the work that critics
and readers are led back to—were
often “read as explanatory” and
“transparent” (4), returning us to
what vocabulary did to Spicer. The
third grouping of essays investigates works and practices at the
inside of that vocabulary in order to
rethink authorship, agency, and the
complications of using a lyric identity. Turning for support to a 1987
essay by Burton Hatlen, Vincent
then addresses the primary concern of the collection: “For a poet
whose greatest and strongest commentary was about how ‘language
turns against those who use it,’ it is
strange that Spicer is so often and
so fervently taken as if his directives
weren’t also, as Hatlen insists they
must be read, in language” (9).
In language is itself a difficult
demand, especially when language
so actively resists the will of its
users, the self-erasure of the runcible mountain:
We shall clear the trees
back, the lumber of our
pasts and futures
back, because we are on a
diamond, because it is
our diamond
Pushed forward from.
And our city shall stand
as the lumber rots and
Runcible mountain
crumbles, and the ocean,
eating all of the islands,
comes to meet us.2
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“Runcible” is a nonsense word and
Spicer’s capitalization of it marks
it as a name that is attached to the
mountain, a misheard “sense” that
pulls the poetic landscape back
into its own made-ness. The runcible mountain is the site where
language reclaims images and tradition, sweeping them back into a
negativity that after all we still only
have language to tell about—hence,
the widespread use of dis-closure as
a way of narrating critical activity.
This is, of course, what makes writing about Spicer so difficult: this
struggle to use the same language
that undoes language to come back
to language. Blaser was trying to
find a way to talk about everything that disappears when both
poetry and the poet are unmoored
by language from any origins in the
image, vision, or intention.
Kevin Killian’s “Spicer and the
Mattachine” begins to consider the
question of how “we” have found
ourselves in Spicer’s near-total textualization. Using newly available
documents from the Mattachine
Society’s archive, Killian traces
Spicer’s “counterintuitive” involvement with direct political action
during the spring and summer of
1953 (16). In materials as quotidian
as meeting minutes and memos, we
see Spicer recording the ways that
self, community, and the political being exist in language, first
by becoming language objects and
then by being tied (Spicer would
later used the term fix here, and not
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happily) to opposing radical notions
of gay identity (18–19). Killian also
addresses Spicer’s attempt to give
the group an alternative name; the
work that the poet put into proposing “Tercellan” shows him engaged
in the process of using language to
separate name from meaning, a gesture that would later figure prominently in his poetics, most notably
in major works like Heads of the
Town Up to the Aether (1962): “We
may read Tercellan as a name that
might signify nearly everything
(to the observant) or nothing (to
the police); it’s a name emblematic
of its era, of bad faith, of slippery
cold-war second guessing” (20).
How Killian gently reorients readers from documents back to intentional texts suggests that Spicer, in
his application of language to the
Mattachine’s activities during his
months of involvement, was looking to this language not as a way
to represent “gay identity,” but as
a way to reconstruct the category
of identity itself. So while it may at
first seem odd to leave the question
of the effect of Spicer’s involvement
with the Mattachine on his poetry
until the end of the essay, the result
is that Killian requires the reader
to perform the most difficult work
of the essay herself. That is, we
must come face to face with the
knot Spicer tied around the lyric
self without recourse to the tempting abstraction of Spicer’s opposed
notions of “nationalism” and “localism” or “regionalism” (31–32).

“No human being should have
to be a lightning rod,” writes Maria
Damon in her essay “Jack Spicer’s
Ghost Forms,” a piece that similarly addresses the complications
of a self that resides in language
by considering this existence in
terms of the double consciousness
of “gay identity,” both “empowered
by community and embarrassed to
be taking up space” (148). There
is here, as in Killian’s piece, no
simple one-to-one correspondence
between Spicer’s sexuality and his
poetics. Damon connects the way
Spicer situates himself within his
“historical circumstance” to “the
notion of vestige, whose derivation from vestigium—footprint—
implies a negative space which
asserts an absent presence, something or someone who has come
and gone, leaving a trace of writing” (138). Spicer designates the
coexistence of different ways of
being through a series of present
contingent linguistic disclosures
correspondent to the absence and
vestigial reappearance of the lyric
self in his poems. Damon revisits
her own work on Spicer over the
course of a decade to question the
“problematic and ahistorical . . .
belief that it is noble or even possible
to escape into the freedom of pure
language” (147). All of this seems to
enact Michael Davidson’s thoughts
on the “ontology of absence” in
Spicer’s poetics, and in the end
Damon’s essay brings us back to
its own, now ghostly and doubled,
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uncanny, opening pages: “‘It’—the
ghost, vestigial form, the evidence
that has been dragged off the scene
leaving its tracks and lines in the
surface dirt of cultural history . . .
[I]t is the body of already available
poetry on which any poet’s work
feeds—that is, it is The Tradition or
Traditions—which both exist and
do not” (139). Catherine Imbroglio,
in
“‘Impossible
Audiences’:
Camp, the Orphic, and Art as
Entertainment in Jack Spicer’s
Poetry,” calls this the “principal
Orphic paradox” in Spicer’s work:
“[T]hat it is through language that
we represent the way the world
eludes us in language” (121). Camp
acts within the tyranny of systems
as an agent of negativity and “incessant rearticulation” (102).
The ontology of absence seems
also to haunt Norman Finkelstein’s
essay, which directly follows
Damon’s. In “Spicer’s Reason to
‘Be-/Leave,’” Finkelstein looks
to Spicer’s antinomianism as the
expression of “the dialectical tension between poetry and religious
faith that unfolds in his writing” (157). At the same time that
Spicer’s antinomianism places him
in a tradition of American poetics
that privileges the immediacy of
revelation, his commitment to the
irredeemable fallenness of a world
created by language makes every
poetic act “an intolerable act of bad
faith” (160). Finkelstein seems to
lead readers ever back to the contradiction that an act of bad faith is still
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always first an act of faith, and it
is in this profane illumination, this
radically negative moment of insufficiency, that we can begin to detect
the contours of Spicer’s “outside.” It
is in this absence that the poet must
“be like God” and “consume him
self through poetry” in such a way
that living true to poetry becomes a
kind of grace (163): “In our search
for God, however, all we have is
language” (166). The essay strives,
finally, to truly come after Spicer,
not trying to anticipate his tricks or
second guess the intentions of some
kind of hidden “I” within his language. The intolerable act and the
insufficiency of language provide
only “a conclusion at which Spicer
could never arrive” (172).
Tradition is necessary and intolerable in Sokolsky’s essay, where
we see Spicer establishing it in the
“subtle violence” of character assassination (197). The essay urges readers to look forward from Spicer’s
knotty relationships with both present and absent figures toward the
designation as a progenitor of language poetry that would come after.
In this context, Sokolsky sets out to
trace the “vicissitudes of the figurative structure of character assassination” (196), a course through
the integrity and treachery of “the
evacuation of meaning” (200), to
the initiation of the “dissolution
of the ‘thingness’ of . . . political
crisis, a process on which the state
of poetry seems to depend” (203).
The essay is as illuminating as any
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written to date on Spicer’s poetic
practice and the subtle violence of
his creation of tradition through
erasure; the scope of the argument
extends from the level of language’s
own self-erasure on the very page in
the “odd verb form that makes the
line ‘Eros/Do that’ an imperative,”
through to the total destruction of
the poetic personality (206). “For
Spicer,” Sokolsky writes, “political
cataclysm leads to a recalibration of
syntax which registers as a renewed
mobility of meanings that is itself a
mode of tactical aggression” (204).
This is assassination in the service
of lyric catachresis or otherwise
“unimaginable continuance” (11):
the imperative “Eros/Do that” that
at once falls apart and is also the
love that will let you go on. Now,
imagine this as language poetry.
Where the essays in this collection occasionally stumble is by
trying to overcome Spicer’s negativity. In Kelly Holt’s “Spicer’s
Poetic Correspondence: ‘A Pun
the Letter Reflects,’” for example,
I parted ways with the author over
her positivization of the idea of
tradition, as expressed in Spicer’s
first letter to Lorca, as “never really
losing anything” (50). I found her
essay tightly thought and insightful, yet when Spicer states “tradition means much more than that,”
he is not offering a corrective, or a
vision of what tradition should be.
He is recognizing the enormous
scope of the dead forms that have
managed to redefine “invention.”

Michael Snediker, in his essay
“Jack Spicer’s Billy the Kid: Beyond
the Singular Personal,” reads the
serial poem as “the pleasures and
aggressions (and consolations) of
love, stretched across time” (182).
Does seriality, as Vincent poses in
his introduction, evacuate or recuperate the lyric subject? Or is the
opposition not quite that simple?
Snediker resituates the serial poem,
by way of its affective resonances,
in negative relation to the city we
create in our bar talk: “Not a single one-night stand, nor a proliferation of one-night stands, but the
proliferation of nights (and days)
held together by the resonances
between them: which is also to say,
held together by the angers and
frustrations unique to those particular resonances” (183). Vincent’s
own contribution, “Pinnacle of No
Explanation,” interrogates Spicer’s
allegedly unfinished detective novel
as materializations of what Spicer
famously called “our fuss and fury
at each other.” The novel’s mystery, Vincent proposes, and in so
doing provides readers with a fresh
critical approach to the poetry that
came after, “is this: that a monadic
substance—fictionality, story—can
split like a blob or mercury, do violence to itself, the settle back into a
single substance” (83).
What does it mean, finally, after
all this, for criticism to come After
Spicer? Vincent proposes a Spicer
criticism freed from the lore of
the deathbed and the bars: “His
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last words must shed the simple
deictics of a death narrative . . . ‘My
vocabulary did this to me’—and
led you, reader, after his death, to
his poems” (12). Yet here, Vincent
denies Spicer’s existence in lan
guage when he ignores the poet’s
final directive in favor of a more
facile transparency, indeed the
simple deictics of a death narrative,
to describe Spicer’s poetic practice.
Jack Spicer’s actual last words,
according to Blaser’s account, were
“Your love will let you go on.”
The collection closes with
Keith and Rosmarie Waldrop’s
collaboratively authored “Spiced
Language,” a multivocal but also
crucially metapoetic occupation of
the runcible mountain. Perhaps
what is truly After Spicer, what
we go on to, through the knots
and double crosses and the runcible mountain and the Broadway
Tunnel, with our love is the irresistibly unknowable (8)—what Ted
Berrigan called “the grace of the
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make-believe bed.” As Finkelstein
reminds readers, Spicer’s “understanding that ‘The real poetry is
beyond us’ . . . can never be put
aside or unlearned” (168). It is our
own struggle with living in language to which we have gone on.
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Limestone, Maine, where she teaches at the
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